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OVERVIEW 
This paper provides a succinct analysis of 
South Sudan as a political marketplace, 
focusing on the last fifteen years, from the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 up until late 
2019. The paper seeks to provide a framework 
that allows South Sudanese actors—especially 
those concerned with promoting peace, 
democracy and justice—to analyze their 
country’s predicament so as to understand the 
implications of different courses of action, or 
the likely outcome of allowing events to run 
their course. 
The paper focuses on applying the political 
marketplace framework (PMF) to the ‘security 
arena’ which refers to the diverse array of 
political actors that have military capability, 
including those who formally qualify as state 
security providers as well as insurgents and 
others, who collude and compete (including 
through armed violence) for power, profit and 
position.1 In particular, the paper traces the 
effects of volatility and turbulence in the 
political system on (a) the existence, 
proliferation, organization and nature of 
security actors, and (b) the nature of the 
relationships between smaller and more local 
security actors, and those that are larger and 
better able to access external support, the 
‘dominant’ security actors/groups.  
The paper also focuses on the role played by 
external actors, namely the international and 
                                                     
1 See Hills 2014, for this concept.  
regional sponsors of the IGAD peace process. 
This includes the so-called Troika (consisting 
of the USA, UK and Norway), and from time to 
time, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and 
Egypt; they act bilaterally but also sometimes 
collectively, through the UN, AU, IGAD or EU.  
As is the case elsewhere in the region, these 
external actors sponsor, support and arm 
various groups and factions in the conflict, 
while also being involved in international 
efforts to end the conflict. Through their 
material and financial support, including their 
decisions to withdraw support, these external 
actors (and especially the neighboring 
countries) act as ‘financiers’ in the conflict. 
They also try to ‘regulate’ the political market 
through various peace-making initiatives. The 
paper finds that the political market in South 
Sudan responds swiftly to the decisions and 
signals of these external actors in their joint 
capacities as financiers and regulators. 
External actors are neither omnipotent nor 
infallible readers of the political market — their 
(mis)calculations while engaging in peace 
processes, have profoundly altered the 
dynamics of the political system in South 
Sudan. This is analogous to the 
miscalculations of a national monetary and 
anti-trust or competition regulator.  
In South Sudan, the primary tool used by 
external actors to shape the political market is 
not coercion but instead (a) material support 
for different domestic actors, and (b) the ways 
in which they have created expectations about 
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future political dispensations and the 
associated opportunities for accessing 
centralized rents. These expectations are given 
shape through the formulae of their peace 
processes, peace agreements and sanctions. 
In other words, not only have some external 
actors supported different factions in the 
conflict, they have also created expectations 
among South Sudanese political-military 
entrepreneurs about the future structure of a 
rentier state. South Sudanese political actors 
have arranged themselves or tried to arrange 
themselves accordingly. In a well-financed 
market, such future rents may be relatively 
insignificant; however, in an underfunded2 
political marketplace like South Sudan their 
value is tangible and real. When armed group 
leaders anticipate that they will be able to 
access future rents within a particular political 
configuration, they strike more stable bargains; 
as future rents become more likely, there is 
less short-term bargaining and less volatility.  
It bears repeating that the PMF does not claim 
to be a complete explanation of the politics of 
South Sudan, let alone the society and culture 
of South Sudanese. Rather, it is a tool that 
helps explain the behaviour of South Sudanese 
political and military elites, and therefore 
assists those who wish to see their country 
organized according to a different social and 
political logic. 
This paper was completed in November 2019, 
at the point at which the (delayed) deadline for 
the formation of the South Sudanese 
Government of National Unity was again 
postponed. Recurrent prevarication over 
making firm commitments to an ostensibly 
durable political settlement—maintaining the 
informal modus of power subject to continual 
informal bargaining—is characteristic of an 
                                                     
2 There have been periods when the South Sudanese 
political marketplace has been flush with political finance; 
these funds have not been well managed.  
unsettled political marketplace, and in this case 
reflects the habitual tactical calculations of the  
different South Sudanese actors about their 
respective bargaining positions. In Sudan there 
is even a word for it, tagility, skill in making use 
of the politics of delay. That said, the delays in 
the formation of a government of national unity 
may have inadvertently created a window of 
opportunity for policymakers to explore ways 
of furthering the agendas of peace, justice and 
democracy. The starting point for those 
explorations must be the recognition that the 
R-ARCSS is both an incomplete peace deal and 
a successful ceasefire document. There are 
more dangers in trying to make the R-ARCSS 
‘complete’ according to a deadline than in 
utilizing the recurrent delays to address 
essential agendas including inter alia the 
resolution of the boundaries of states, national 
dialogue and mechanisms for transitional 
justice. 
This paper is organized chronologically, around 
‘critical junctures’ in the evolution of the South 
Sudanese political marketplace. It assumes a 
working knowledge of the various components 
of the political marketplace model and of 
South Sudanese political history; it is meant to 
be read in conjunction with the framing papers 
on the political marketplace.3  
 
 
3 For the political marketplace generally, see de Waal 
2015, and for the framing papers, see de Waal 2018; de 
Waal and Spatz 2018. 
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Period 
Economic 
Characteristics 
Political Finance Beneficiaries Regional Context 
1972-83 
Aid and debt-led 
boom 
State borrowing 
Politicians and crony 
capitalists 
Junior within Sudan 
1983-2004 War economy 
Pillage, military 
clientship 
Military officers and their 
business partners 
Cockpit for regional 
rivalry 
2005-11 Oil and aid boom Oil, contracting SPLM/A leaders 
Challenge to (northern) 
Sudan 
2012-13 Economic crisis 
(Dwindling) payouts 
from reserves 
None Return to junior status 
2013-15 War economy 
(Small) pillage and 
clientship 
None 
Cockpit for regional 
rivalry 
2015-18 
War economy and 
oil 
Oil, pillage and clientship Military leaders 
Cockpit for regional 
rivalry 
2018-19 
War economy and 
oil 
Oil, pillage and clientship Military leaders 
Junior status, regional 
collusion 
Table 1: South Sudan’s Political Economy and Political Marketplace 1970s-2019 
Figure 1: A timeline of critical junctures in the South Sudanese political market 
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1. The Evolution of South Sudan’s 
Political Economy 
This section provides a brief history of the 
evolution of the political economy and political 
market in South Sudan after the signing of the 
CPA.  
A summary of the different phases and their 
key features is presented on the previous page.  
During the long civil war (1983-2004), southern 
Sudan’s political economy was based on 
plunder and military clientship. The 
Government of Sudan (GoS), which was in 
deep economic crisis in the 1980s and ‘90s, 
fought its counterinsurgency using militia, 
which repaid themselves through pillage, and 
through military-commercial partnerships in 
which army officers cut deals with merchants 
whereby the latter would profit from army 
operations, for example by trading in scarce 
goods in besieged towns, selling stolen 
livestock, or felling timber. The Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) 
relied heavily on sponsorship from 
neighbouring states, notably Ethiopia, Uganda 
and Eritrea, and some of its commanders also 
benefited from the war economy. 
The outbreak of the war in 1983 halted the 
development of southern Sudan’s oil fields. 
They remained neglected until the late 1990s, 
when Chinese oil companies took over the 
concessions and built the necessary 
infrastructure, running the risks of operating in 
a war zone. Sudan exported its first oil in 1999. 
Over the following five years the GoS’s revenue 
expanded tenfold. 
A major element in the incentive for the SPLA 
to negotiate a peace agreement with the GoS 
was the prospect of gaining a share in Sudan’s 
oil revenues and the related fear that, should 
the south fail to make peace, the GoS would be 
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able to expand its military capacity and 
neutralize the neighbouring countries through 
oil diplomacy. The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005. 
The principal stated goal of the CPA was to 
‘make unity attractive’ but it contained a 
provision for a referendum on self-
determination after six years. 
After the death of John Garang in July 2005, 
Salva Kiir and the majority of the SPLM/A 
followed a strategy aimed at securing 
independence at the end of the interim period 
scheduled for 2011. Although the formal 
determinant of whether South Sudan remained 
as part of Sudan or became independent was 
the majority of votes in the referendum, both 
parties worked on the assumption that the 
most powerful player would determine that 
result. Both also assumed that the relevant 
power formula would be control over territory 
and populations by armed units, and the 
allegiance of members of southern Sudan’s 
political and military elite, and that such 
allegiance would be determined in part by 
money. In other words, whoever paid most to 
southern Sudanese commanders (who 
controlled territory) and politicians (who 
controlled the seat of government in Juba), 
would get to decide whether or not the 
referendum was held and whether it was a 
credible vote. What therefore emerged was a 
rivalrous duopoly where both Khartoum and 
Juba poured their political budgets into a zero-
sum arms-and-patronage race.4 The SPLM/A 
succeeded in pricing the GoS out of the 
southern Sudanese political marketplace, and 
southern Sudan came to resemble something 
closer to a centralized, functional authoritarian 
kleptocracy. As the NCP consolidated its hold 
on northern Sudan, especially when it saw off 
the electoral challenge of the opposition 
including the SPLM in 2010, the northern 
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Sudanese marketplace could be described in 
the same terms. 
From the signing of the CPA up to early 2012, 
southern Sudan/South Sudan5 was organized 
as a rentier state, financed overwhelmingly by 
oil, with international aid and military patronage 
from Khartoum acting as secondary sources of 
funds. This led to the creation of a wage-
earning class centered around state funds 
(mostly soldiers and some civil servants), as 
well as crony capitalists clustered around state 
contracting, and also attracted businesspeople 
ready to take the risks of investing in import-
export trade, hotels and retail, with a chance of 
very high short-term returns. In Sudan as a 
whole, the political market was organized as a 
hybrid system containing a well-regulated 
duopsony (that is, a market with only two 
purchasers of services) and an unregulated 
market in Darfur.6 In southern Sudan, the 
SPLM/A appeared to be operating as a 
conglomerate. This, however, was a disguise: 
beneath the cooperation imposed by external 
conditions—the shared goal of national 
independence—both the security sector and 
the ruling party were structured as oligopolies. 
The oligopolists were political rivals who 
decided to collude by force of circumstance, 
using oil rents to dominate the marketplace 
and price out the competition from Khartoum.  
The political production function of the GoSS 
and SPLM/A was, at its core, to turn oil 
revenues into political payoffs. At 
independence in July 2011, the new 
Government of the Republic of South Sudan 
(GoRSS) did not change this production 
function. Its revenues increased: it was no 
longer paying half of the income from oil to 
Khartoum, and it now could manage its state 
finances independently from Sudan. However, 
the leaders of South Sudan had not resolved 
                                                     
5 We follow convention in using ‘southern Sudan’ before 
independence and ‘South Sudan’ thereafter. 
the question of how to handle their victory. 
Some were content to take President Omar al-
Bashir and the Khartoum leadership at their 
word and put an end to the arms-and-
patronage competition. This would have 
entailed abandoning some long-held allies in 
northern Sudan and on the contested border. 
Others saw that the Juba-Khartoum rivalry 
would continue into the future, and that South 
Sudan should take advantage of its newly 
sovereign status, its financial reserves, and the 
acrimony within post-secession northern 
Sudan, to press home its advantage and 
become the senior partner in the relationship 
with the former oppressor. Those seeking 
confrontation won the upper hand, in part 
because in the parallel debate in Khartoum, 
hardliners were also winning. 
If South Sudan were to enter military 
confrontation with Sudan, and its oil were to 
continue being pumped to market through the 
existing pipeline to Port Sudan, the GoS would 
of course be expected to confiscate the oil and 
use it for its war effort. On the basis of a 
dispute with Khartoum over the terms of 
payment for the pipeline, escalated by 
Sudanese theft of South Sudanese oil, South 
Sudan therefore shut down its oil production in 
January 2012. 
After the shutdown of oil production, South 
Sudan was transformed into a rentier state 
without rent. Its cash reserves were not 
sufficient. At the same time, political elites and 
armed groups expected rents (at similar or 
expanded levels) to return shortly. In this cash-
6 de Waal 2019a. 
 
After the shutdown of oil production, 
South Sudan was transformed into a 
rentier state without rent. 
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deprived marketplace, the centralized rent 
allocation system was no longer able to 
manage rivalries within the governing 
oligopoly. Combined with political 
mismanagement by President Salva Kiir, this 
led to a political crisis. The collusive oligopoly 
was rapidly transformed into a rivalrous 
oligopoly. During the first eleven months of 
2013, the key actors struggled to keep the 
political competition out of the security arena, 
fearful that if the political contestation spread 
to the army, the army would split along ethnic 
lines (which are also patronage lines) and civil 
war would ensue. They succeeded in this until 
13 December, when the first shots were fired in 
Juba, and, as feared, the SPLA split apart. 
After the outbreak of civil war, there were two 
main sources of political finance. The first was 
oil, from which revenues, despite being far 
lower than before 2012, were still the most 
substantial income for the state and 
politicians. Among other things, this paid for 
Ugandan military assistance kept the GoRSS in 
power,  The second consisted of security 
payments and/or in-kind assistance from 
Khartoum (to SPLA-IO). Secondary sources 
included some funds obtained from cross 
border smuggling and dealing in aid. As oil 
rents declined, the diversion and manipulation 
of humanitarian aid became more significant, 
with military-political actors returning to 
methods of exploiting relief agencies and 
programmes, that they had utilized in the long 
civil war of 1983-2005. Overall, political finance 
was in short supply. As a result, the GoRSS 
mortgaged future oil production at a 
discounted rate in order to secure short-term 
political finance, and signed less-than-
favourable terms with Sudan for the same 
reason. The flows of political finance were 
asymmetrical from the beginning of the 
conflict: the GoRSS, as the sovereign 
government, controlled oil revenues and official 
aid, which were far greater resources than 
those possessed by the SPLA-IO. This disparity 
deepened as the war continued, especially as 
the GoRSS made military gains. Another 
challenge facing the market in this period was 
that the different sources of political finance 
were not aligned. Sudan and Uganda were 
sponsoring rival political factions. In 2018, with 
the R-ARCSS, this shifted as Khartoum 
recognized that the GoRSS was militarily 
dominant, with the result that Sudan (facing a 
fast-deepening financial crisis) sought a deal 
with the GoRSS over oil exports. In turn this 
allowed Uganda and Sudan to reach an 
arrangement about financing and security 
behind the façade of a formal peace 
agreement. For much of this period, the 
political system in South Sudan operated at 
two levels: an asymmetrical oligopoly with two 
conglomerates (the GoRSS, which was 
stronger and gaining, and SPLA-IO, which had a 
precarious position) existing alongside a poorly 
regulated free market with proliferation of 
smaller armed groups, and short-term 
opportunistic deal-making.   
In the current period, the GoRSS has finally 
succeeded in having its dominant position in 
the South Sudanese political market 
recognized by all key regional actors and 
therefore is trying to re-establish a centralized 
authoritarian kleptocracy. It is doing this on the 
Khartoum model with the National Security 
Services (the NSS) controlling the companies 
that manage oil contracts and other key 
businesses. Pres. Kiir is also relying on the NSS 
and other para-military battalions to ‘coup-
proof’ his regime. The national army (now the 
South Sudan People’s Defence Force) has 
been deliberately weakened.  
The R-ARCSS has served three main functions. 
First, it has reduced the Sudan-Uganda rivalry. 
Second, it has delivered a workable ceasefire 
between the principal protagonists, the GoRSS 
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and the SPLA-IO. Third, the ongoing peace 
negotiations have provided a political process, 
protected by the regional and international 
sponsors of the peace, which can allow South 
Sudanese to address a wide range of political 
issues. For many South Sudanese, this de 
facto political unsettlement7 is more 
advantageous than the alternative of declaring 
peace, forming a Transitional Government of 
National Unity (TGNU), and replacing the peace 
process with domestic politics. For the GoRSS 
this allows Pres. Kiir to continue cutting 
informal bargains. For the SPLA-IO, it may be 
preferable to gamble on a change in 
circumstances that reconfigures the political 
marketplace rather than accepting the 
limitations imposed by the R-ARCSS. For junior 
political players and civil society actors, the 
peace process provides a safer opportunity for 
pressing their agenda than the domestic 
political processes that will follow the 
formation of the TGNU.  
In the sections that follow, we outline the 
evolution of the security arena in 
southern/South Sudan within the context of 
the overall political marketplace.  
2. The Political Marketplace under the 
CPA 
2.1. The Political Firms (SPLA, SAF and 
SSDF/OAGs) 
In 2005, the intent of the CPA signatories was 
not to deepen Sudan’s political marketplace. 
To the contrary, they saw the fundamental 
issues of Sudan as lying in the failure of the 
country’s political elites, since independence, to 
agree on a common national project. Both 
John Garang and Ali Osman Taha had 
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8 Although the SPLA and the SAF were each military 
branches of SPLM and the Government of Sudan (GOS) 
respectively which influence the decision-making of the 
SSDF and SAF, the analysis will focus on the SPLA and 
developed visions of ‘New Sudan’—one secular 
and the other Islamist—they now agreed to 
align them. They saw the war economy, the 
corruption, the fragmentation of armed groups, 
and other elements of the political marketplace 
as symptoms of the deeper malaise of the 
country, which would be swept away in the 
new political settlement. This transformative 
agenda never had a chance. Garang died in a 
helicopter crash just 21 days after becoming 
First Vice President, and Ali Osman—whose 
rivals in Khartoum accused him of having sold 
out on their political vision and having 
abandoned their political tactics of divide-and-
rule—lost his real power.  
The structure of the southern Sudanese 
political marketplace in the period following the 
signing of the CPA in 2005 was as follows. 
Two major and many subordinate military-
political groups or ‘political firms’ could be 
identified. These ‘major’ armed groups were 
the SPLA,8 and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), 
while the remaining armed groups can be 
grouped within the category of South Sudan 
Defense Force (SSDF) and Other Armed 
Groups (OAGs). The labels ‘major’ and 
‘subordinate’, as we describe below, can be 
attached to these groups as a result of external 
peace-making efforts.   
(1) The SPLA  
After the CPA, and especially following the 
Juba Agreement between Pres. Salva Kiir and 
the SSDF in January 2006, there was a period 
of SPLA’s organizational restructuring and 
dramatic expansion. Despite its activities 
starting from 1983, the formal organizational 
structure for military divisions were established 
at the ground level only after 2006, with six 
the SAF for simplicity while factoring-in these influences. 
The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) 
which operated separately from SAF for similar objectives 
is not included. 
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divisions and four independent brigades.9 
Regardless of this inchoate development 
stage, the post-CPA saw the expansion of 
organized forces from around 40,000 in 2004 
to a payroll of 240,000 (although including 
many ghost soldiers) in 2011,10 totaling about 
80% of the total government employees in 
southern Sudan.  
Such a radical force expansion lacking 
consolidated organizational structure could 
have risked undermining the SPLA’s combat 
capabilities. In fact, during the 2005–11 Interim 
Period, more than 80 percent of defence 
spending was spent on wages and 
allowances,11 indicating the crowding-out of 
arms procurement and training costs. 
However, this seeming contradiction is 
defensible as a rational behaviour in a political 
marketplace. The principal tenet of the SPLA 
strategy was not that it would need to fight the 
SAF in a conventional war, but rather that it 
could pay for the allegiance of the great 
majority of the proxy forces that had previously 
been clients of the GoS, so that the SAF would 
be unable to pursue its favoured strategy of 
fighting by proxy militia. 
(2) Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)  
During the long civil war, the regular units of 
SAF were a minority of the military units 
operating on behalf of the GoS in southern 
Sudan. Most military operations and local 
security activities were sub-contracted to 
southern Sudanese militia and paramilitaries, 
which after the 1997 Khartoum Agreement 
became formally consolidated into the SSDF. 
Other forces included Popular Defence Forces 
of various kinds (Arab militia and mujahideen), 
foreign units such as the Lord’s Resistance 
Army, and splinter groups from the SPLA 
utilized on an opportunistic basis. None of 
                                                     
9 Rands 2010. 
10 Snowden 2012.  
them were fully integrated into the SAF: rather 
they were associated with it on the basis of 
security pacts between the local political-
military leaders and SAF Military Intelligence 
(MI), which was responsible for the 
organization, financing and operations of these 
groups. 
By 2005, the SAF relied heavily on the SSDF 
units for security in southern Sudan. The SSDF 
units protected key southern towns 
surrounding the oil fields as well GoS garrisons 
in southern Sudan, and were critical in making 
possible the development and operation of the 
country’s emerging oil industry. However, the 
SAF-MI, which largely assumed responsibility 
for directing the SSDF, simultaneously worked 
to limit the SSDF’s power, by keeping the units 
fragmented.12 
(3) South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) and 
Other Armed Groups (OAGs) 
The term ‘other armed groups’ (OAGs) entered 
Sudan’s political lexicon during the 
negotiations leading to the CPA. The starting 
point for the GoS negotiating team was that a 
united Sudan should have just one army (which 
would be SAF) but that SPLA units could be 
integrated into that army. The SPLM/A position 
was that Sudan should have two armies for the 
interim period, on the grounds that the only 
guarantee of the faithful implementation of the 
CPA, especially the provision for self-
determination, was an army for southern 
Sudan. The SSDF and other armed groups and 
militia were not represented in the 
negotiations. Their interests were sacrificed.  
SSDF units were by far the most important of 
the OAGs but differed from the SAF and the 
SPLA in that they lacked a central command 
structure. The SSDF was comprised of a loose 
alignment of approximately 60 armed units 
11 Snowden 2012. 
12 Institute for Security Studies 2004. 
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which had been recognized on the basis of the 
Khartoum Agreement of 1997. Some efforts 
were made to unify the command structure of 
the SSDF over time: a political wing (the UDSF) 
was meant to have been established under the 
Khartoum Agreement, and Lt.-Gen. Paulino 
Matiep was nominated as overall commander 
of the SSDF in 2002. In reality, however, given 
the geographic dispersion of the different 
organizations (as visible in Map 1 below), and 
the SAF-MI’s involvement in dividing the SSDF 
command through practices such as 
contacting and supplying armed units 
individually, the armed units of the SSDF 
retained a high degree of autonomy. Under the 
provisions of the CPA, the SSDF units could 
either dissolve, integrate, subcontract, or 
negotiate with the SPLA or the SAF – this, and 
the specific negotiating tactics they used, are 
described in greater detail below.  
2.2. The CPA and the Reorganization of the 
Security Arena 
The negotiations which led to the signing of 
the CPA in January 2005 were, in large part, 
intended to design a rent allocation formula 
that would satisfy both the GoS/NCP and the 
SPLM/A. In the backdrop of a rapidly 
expanding economy, the CPA created a 
Government of National Unity in Khartoum 
(NCP plus SPLM with other parties given a 
minor role), and an autonomous Government 
of Southern Sudan with the SPLA forming its 
army.13 After a 6-year interim period, and as 
mentioned above, there was to be a vote on 
self-determination for southern Sudan. The 
CPA also prohibited the operation of any 
armed groups outside the SAF and the SPLA, in 
an effort to compel the other militia, notably 
the SSDF/OAGs to ally with one of them, 
dissolve, or face elimination by force of arms. 
In other words, the CPA laid out basic rules for 
                                                     
13 de Waal 2015; de Waal 2014.  
the market interactions among the SPLA, SAF 
and SSDF/OAGs, and recognized the SAF and 
SPLA as ‘superior firms’ and relegated the units 
of the SSDF/OAGs to the role of 
subcontractors.  
Article 2.5 At the end of the six (6) year 
Interim Period there shall be an 
internationally monitored referendum, 
organized jointly by the GOS and the 
SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan 
to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by 
voting to adopt the system of government 
established under the Peace Agreement; 
or to vote for secession.  
Article 7. (a) No armed groups allied to 
either party shall be allowed to operate 
outside the two (SPLA and SAF) forces 
Article 7. (b) The Parties agree that those 
mentioned in 7(a) who have the desire 
and qualify shall be incorporated into the 
organized forces of either Party (Army, 
Police, Prisons and Wildlife forces), while 
the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil 
service and civil society institutions 
In effect, the CPA reimagined the political 
system in Sudan as a collusive duopoly, with 
two dominant political-military actors 
cooperating to govern the country and ‘make 
unity attractive’. This arrangement was to be 
regulated through the efforts of external actors, 
and through the division of rents provided for in 
the peace agreement.14 This system did not 
actually come into being; Sudan during the 
interim period was, as mentioned, more akin to 
two rival kleptocracies in Khartoum and Juba 
engaged in an arms-and-patronage race.  
The bidding war for the southern Sudanese 
security arena was eventually won by the  
14 It is worth noting that Darfur continued to function as 
an unregulated free market.  
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Level of analysis Account 
Political economy 
In this period, southern Sudan/South Sudan was organized as a rentier state, financed 
overwhelmingly by increasing oil production, with international aid and military patronage from 
Khartoum acting as secondary sources of funds. A wage-earning class centered around state 
funds emerged (mostly soldiers and some civil servants), alongside crony capitalists and 
businesspeople seeking to make their money from state-contracting or from investing in import-
export trade, hotels and retail, with a chance of very high short-term returns.  
After South Sudan became independent in 2011, the GoS lost control of the majority of oil funds, 
with implications for its ability to influence the marketplace.  
Structure of political 
firms and strategies 
The CPA organized the market in Sudan as a duopoly financed by a share in oil rents. This could 
also be understood as two rival kleptocracies which were locked in an arms-patronage race and 
which sought to destabilize each other. They did so by supporting armed opposition groups in 
each other’s territorial peripheries. The market in Darfur was unregulated. 
In southern Sudan, the SPLM/A appeared to be operating as a conglomerate. This was a fictive 
arrangement, and beneath the cooperation imposed by the CPA formula, both the security 
sector and the political party were structured as an oligopoly, its members colluding by force of 
circumstance, using oil rents to dominate the marketplace and price out the competition 
(especially competition from Khartoum). 
Organization of the 
security arena 
The effect of this arrangement in the security arena was that of a well-regulated duopsony (that 
is, a market with only two purchasers of political services from different militia and armed 
groups). The bargaining in the security arena was structured by the formula specified in the CPA 
– with smaller armed groups having to ally with either the SPLA or the GoS, or disband.   
The SPLM/A outspent al-Bashir in buying the loyalties of different smaller armed groups. Al-
Bashir also had to spend on managing factional politics in Khartoum and in Darfur, which were 
very expensive. However, some groups could hold out for better deals, because of their control 
over oil fields, or because they could mobilize specific ethnic groups.  
Table 2: 2005-2012: Emergence of two rival kleptocracies funded by oil rents 
Figure 2: Shifts in the southern/South Sudanese political marketplace (2005-12): Two rival kleptocracies 
engaged in an arms and patronage race 
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SPLM/A. This outcome was not clear in mid-
2005 when Garang died and Kiir took over. At 
that time, the security arena effectively 
functioned as a ‘duopsony’ in this period, that 
is, it resembled a market situation in which two 
rival buyers held the controlling power of 
determining the demand for a product or 
service (violence, or the means of inflicting 
violence) from a large number of sellers 
(smaller militia/armed-political groups).  
The form that the political market took in South 
Sudan was not pre-ordained. Up to his death in 
2005, Garang had maintained the policy that a 
collective reconciliation with the SSDF/OAGs 
would not be pursued. After his death, Kiir 
formally adopted a policy of reconciliation, the 
high point of which was the Juba Declaration 
of 2006. This created the particular form of the 
political market for military (sub)contracting in 
southern Sudan. A referendum on self-
determination had already provided for under 
Article 2.5 of the CPA (see above). During the 
Interim Period, the two superior firms began to 
contest over the production of power. They 
anticipated that in any future conflict, control 
over the revenue from oil, would be secured by 
whoever had the allegiance of SSDF units that 
controlled oil-rich areas. They also expected a 
fierce political market and possibly military 
contest over the future control of sovereign 
power in southern Sudan—the political 
outcome at the end of the interim period. For 
the SPLM/A, the objective was to ensure the 
referendum was held and that it controlled the 
territory and population. For the GoS (NCP and 
SAF) it was the opposite: to find a way for the 
referendum not to be held (for example on the 
pretext of insecurity) or for sufficient southern 
elites to ensure that the reported result was, at 
the very minimum, contested. For either to 
achieve its objectives, it was necessary for the 
SPLA and the SAF to newly transact, sub-
contract, and (if possible) integrate SSDF/OAG 
sub-units into the structures of their own firms, 
or (in the case of SAF) enforce its prior 
relations with SSDF units. There were three 
reasons for this. 
First, southern Sudan was characterized by a 
multitude of armed political firms distributed 
across the political arena, each with strong 
connection to its affiliated territory through 
kinship or other affinities. The political market 
position of each individual armed group was 
based upon the (a) particular geographical 
locale from which militia members were drawn 
or which contained economic assets essential 
for the militia’s operations, such as oil fields,  
and which they would defend fiercely, or (b) the 
group identity/ethnicity of militia members, or 
(c) a combination of the above. This made it 
difficult to replace them with other units that 
were comparable in other respects.  
The genesis of the SSDF units illustrates this. 
The main units of the SSDF included the 
remnants of the Nuer-dominated Anyanya II 
movement that had never been properly 
integrated within the SPLA; other breakaway 
factions and renegade commanders of the 
SPLA; and tribal militias that were formed as 
local protection groups in response to local 
conditions including the ill-discipline by SPLA 
fighters in their locales. Such ethnic/tribal-
based attachment and political influence of 
some SSDF forces in their operating areas 
made them extremely difficult to substitute 
with armed groups which may have been 
similar in other respects. 
We refer to this as ‘asset specificity’, that is, the 
extent to which physical and human assets are 
specialized and unique to an armed group or 
political actor, and non-redeployable in other 
contexts.    
Second, geographically, SSDF units covered 
key areas that included oil fields. The SSDF’s 
military reach stretched to the Eastern-Upper  
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Nile and northern Unity Oil fields. For example, 
the Nuer forces under Gordon Kong played a 
critical role in defending the Eastern Upper Nile 
oil fields.  
Last and more fundamentally, some units 
under the SSDF consisted of a significant 
number of soldiers that made any forcible 
military takeover a costly and risky proposition. 
The force strength of the SPLA was generously 
estimated at 40,000 fighters in 200415, 
compared to the other armed groups (OAGs) 
that approximated between 10,000 and 30,000 
in 2006, and SAF which numbered 104,800 in 
2007.16 
2.3. Bargaining by Armed Groups during the 
CPA Interim Period 
Based on Sections 3.1 and 32.2, this section 
analyzes how the SPLA and the SAF competed 
over creating transactional relations with the 
60 units of the SSDF. Three types of 
relationships/bargains are observed: we refer 
to these as ‘Integration’, ‘Absorption’, and 
‘Negotiating’. Integrated forces are placed 
                                                     
15 Snowden 2012.  
16 IISS estimate, 2006. 
under the command of the senior force and 
rank-harmonized, integrated into the command 
and control structures, and actually deployed 
to their assigned locations. When units are 
absorbed within the senior force, the 
integration is agreed, but the units remain in 
the regions where they are already stationed 
and maintain their own command structure. 
Lastly, if forces are negotiating, they are yet to 
agree on the terms but have expressed the 
intention of being absorbed into either the 
SPLA or the SAF. In reality, they may be 
negotiating towards a limited security pact, or 
simply procrastinating on the negotiation 
process, rather than aiming for an end-point of 
integration or absorption. The rationale for 
procrastination is that circumstances might 
change so that the party can get a better deal, 
or as an insurance policy, wanting to keep a 
measure of autonomy in case things took a 
turn for the worse. 
Based on the above definition, the outcome 
was as follows:17 
17 Young 2006. 
Small Arms Survey (2006) 
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Table 3: Relationships between the SPLA, SAF and the 
SSDF 
Note that some of the 60 SSDF units are not 
included in this enumeration. Three units were 
merged before the CPA, the status of one was 
unknown, and one had not finalized its 
alignment. 
Although the SAF struck deals with more units 
than the SPLA, the significant variance in troop 
number among the SSDF units makes it 
difficult to compare the substantial power 
balance between SPLA/SAF from simple 
numbers of SSDF units. Further, it is unclear 
what kinds of SSDF units had been integrated, 
absorbed, or negotiated by the SPLA/SAF (it 
appears that the SAF-absorbed units were 
mostly smaller ones). 
To further examine this point, the table below 
categorizes 60 SSDF factions by their ‘asset-
specificity’.  In the table, armed organizations in 
the vicinity of the oil fields (25 km) as well as in 
Abyei are categorized as having the highest 
asset-specificity. The table uses the numbering 
employed in the Annex to the Small Arms 
Survey (2006). 
Table 4: Asset-specificity and transaction strategies 
between SPLA/SAF and the SSDF 
                                                     
18 Young 2006. 
SSDF factions affiliated with the SAF are 
differentiated by underlining the number. In 
addition, the following units are not included: 
The SAF absorbed the forces, mainly those 
located further than the 25km range from the 
oil fields. Three forces (#41, 43 and 45), 
discounting the small splinter faction #26, were 
within the 25km range of oil fields. The SAF’s 
policy to absorb instead of integrate SSDF 
factions, granting minimal financial assistance 
and leaving the units to loot, helped reduce the 
costs of supplying large numbers of soldiers as 
well as ensuring antagonistic relations with 
local communities18.  
The SPLA’s outcomes varied; they integrated, 
absorbed and negotiated with the SSDF 
factions. Importantly, armed organizations with 
the highest asset-specificity were absorbed or 
negotiated with rather than integrated. For 
example, five of six armed units that were 
being negotiated towards concluding the terms 
of absorption were located within 25km of the 
oil fields or in the strategically important Abyei 
area. The exception, #22, was the armed unit 
of Clement Wani Konga, a Mundari community 
leader who held control over an area from 
Terekeka to Juba, a critical ally required to 
consolidate control over the capital as well as 
the Mundari populace in the area. It is likely 
that the six units, due to their strong leverage, 
were able to procrastinate on the deal without 
succumbing to intimidation and thereby 
maintain or even increase their demands on 
the SPLA. 
 Integration Absorption Negotiating 
SPLA 6 9 6 
SAF 0 34 0 
  Integration Absorption Negotiating 
Within 
25km 
range of oil 
field / 
Abyei 
 
13, 26, 41, 
43, 45 
10, 11, 12, 
19, 20 
Further 
than 25km 
range of oil 
field 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
14 -18, 23, 
24, 27, 28, 
31-37, 40, 
42, 44 - 47, 
49, 50 - 58 
22 
Merged before CPA 1-3 
Unknown /unverifiable 
4, 21, 25, 29, 38, 39, 48, 
59 
Leader unclear / recalled 30 
Had not aligned yet 60 
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In economic theory, when a firm enters into a 
contract with a supplier, for an input or service, 
bureaucratic and transaction costs dictate how 
production is structured. Bureaucratic costs 
refer to the costs of administering a 
hierarchical system (i.e. within the firm), 
whereas transaction costs refer to the costs to 
the firm of finding a supplier, negotiating with 
that supplier and policing and enforcing the 
contract for supply. If an input or a service is 
highly asset specific, transaction costs 
increase, because the supplier is able to bid-up 
prices, and enforcement becomes difficult. An 
alternative would be for the firm to internalize 
production – and in the South Sudanese 
political market, that would mean that either 
the SAF or the SPLA might try and find 
alternatives to the political-military roles 
performed by the SSDF units/OAGs. The 
southern Sudanese case suggests that this is 
difficult, if not impossible. The territorial asset 
specificity of the SSDF units and the OAGs 
were closely tied to forms of political 
mobilization including on the basis of identity 
and ethnicity, which in turn made it nearly 
                                                     
19 Lacher 2012. 
20 McEvoy and LeBrun 2010. 
impossible for both the SAF and SPLA to 
simply replace those units with others or its 
own armed units.       
2.4. Thorny Road from Negotiation to 
Absorption/Integration (SPLA and 
SSDF) 
Once SSDF units expressed their alignment 
with the SPLA, the negotiation took place. In 
the beginning, the Office of the President and 
the Ministry for National Security negotiated 
the terms of the agreement with the SSDF unit 
commanders, contingent to their ‘threat 
potential’ measured in terms of the 
commander’s ability to secure external funding 
or mobilize actors.19 This process remained 
pending for the six armed units described as 
‘Negotiating’ in Table 1. The terms of 
integration could include military promotion, 
government appointments, cash, future regular 
salaries, etc.20 In the case of Clement Wani, 
Garang offered him the position of governor of 
Central Equatoria State following the CPA, 
before Clement eventually announced that he 
was joining his forces with the SPLA/M.21  
21 Young 2006. 
Integration 
Deal 
• Office of the President and Ministry for National Security 
• Offer amnesty to the group commanders, negotiate terms of integration according to "Threat Potential 
• military promotion,  government appointment, cash, cars, houses, accommodation, future regular salaries 
Rebel 
application 
• Rebel commanders submit the lists of forces to be integrated. 
• Soldiers are convened to the Cantonment sites, the costs covered by SPLA. 
• Committee to visit assembly sites to verify integrating forces. 
Screening 
• Interview of members of the armed groups at the Cantonment sites. 
• Committee and SPLA decides which of the integrated forces would be officers in the organized group. 
• Officer status is generally ranked by integrated forces' manpower*. 
Adjustments 
• Submission of integration list by the Committee to the President. 
• The President could alter rankings to encourage the integrated armed group leader's compliance 
Integration 
Work 
• SPLA Administration, Training and Operations calculate salaries for integration. 
• Assignment for deployment would be given in accordance to SPLA Divisions. 
• Training ("Reset" Program) 
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The flowchart is organized on the basis of 
Warner (2016). 
When the terms were agreed, the troops were 
then convened to the cantonment sites where 
they were assessed by the SPLA. The SPLA 
decided the commander’s status by its 
manpower, subject to a final adjustment by the 
president.22  
This process of rank-harmonization was 
challenging. SAF had awarded SSDF 
commanders very high ranks during the war, 
with associated salaries and perks such as 
vehicles and personal guards, and those 
commanders would not accept demotion on 
switching to the SPLA. The SPLA leadership 
held the SSDF’s former alliance with the 
national government in Khartoum in contempt, 
and worried that integrating large numbers of 
senior officers at their existing ranks would 
distort the political balance at the expense of 
existing SPLA commanders.23 This was a 
major factor leading to the massive promotion 
of SPLA commanders to general rank in 
parallel to the integration and absorption 
processes. Senior-level commander integration 
was mostly still unresolved in 2007.24 
Commanders in the expanded SPLA, 
regardless of their previous affiliation, had a 
strong interest in resisting the centralization 
and institutionalization of the army. Three 
attempts to introduce a unitary roster of troops 
were blocked. The reasons included payroll 
inflation and ghost soldiers, the practice 
whereby unit commanders underpaid their 
subordinates (who often comprised their 
relatives, enlisted on the understanding that 
they would only claim part of their salary 
entitlement, on the ‘reward and defraud’ basis), 
and the political preference for commanders 
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23 Young 2007. 
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and local political leaders to keep ethnically 
homogenous, locally-rooted troops in their 
localities. As a consequence, the ethnic basis 
of military mobilization, which had been a 
persistent feature of the war years, was 
sustained during the peacetime expansion of 
the SPLA. 
Although this analysis has focused on the 
SPLA’s relationship-building with SSDF units 
during the post-CPA period, in the longer term, 
the problems with the incomplete 
absorption/integration process kept the 
political business relationship between the 
SPLA and the SSDF units unresolved.25 The 
limited implementation of the integration 
process meant that it had limited success as a 
long-term stabilization measure, which 
eventually contributed to its disintegration in 
2013.26 The comparatively strong standing of 
the SSDF units prevented the SPLA from 
completing the absorption/integration, 
demonstrating that outcomes in the political 
marketplace are driven both by the interests 
and power of the superior firms, and by those 
of the sub-contractors. 
3. Civil war (2013-18) 
3.1. Pre-War   
In the period between independence in 2011 
and the outbreak of war, South Sudan’s 
political arena was formally structured as an 
SPLM conglomerate: a dominant party with 
different factions, some of which were aligned 
with military units. This disguised the real 
political arrangement – the component parts 
of the conglomerate were exercising greater 
political autonomy and becoming overt rivals. 
The security arena was formally structured as 
a single army, with police, wildlife, prisons 
25 Warner 2016. 
26 Warner 2016. 
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service and national security as associated 
security entities, all supposedly under the same 
institutionalized control. In reality, the security 
arena was not integrated, although most units 
had been absorbed within the SPLA 
conglomerate. As we have seen, in the years 
after the CPA, Kiir spent massively on 
expanding the military payroll to make it too 
expensive for the GoS to rent southern militia. 
In the security arena, therefore, the outcome 
was akin to that of a weakly regulated 
monopsony, that is, a market with a single 
buyer for security services. Although Khartoum 
still existed as an alternative financier for 
aspirant firms seeking leverage for 
negotiations vis-à-vis Juba, its role was 
significantly curtailed, and SPLM/A used 
violence to deter potential rent-seeking 
rebellions. As a result, the leverage of 
subcontractor armed groups against the 
government had reduced substantially, and 
most had been absorbed within the SPLA 
conglomerate.   
However, the SPLM/A conglomerate was not 
stable. The political party remained lightly 
stitched together from its constituent factions 
(akin to firms or divisions competing within a 
commercial conglomerate). Kiir’s position, 
achieved on an emergency basis following the 
death of Garang, was considered assailable 
now that the SPLM/A had achieved its 
strategic goal of national independence. The 
SPLM/A had not established informal means 
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or norms of mediating competition within the 
conglomerate. 
Leaders of factions within the SPLM began to 
conspire to challenge Kiir for the leadership, led 
chiefly by Riek Machar, Kiir’s deputy. A core 
imbalance in the SPLM/A structure fueled this 
competition. Nuer formed the bulk of fighters 
in the SPLA, a legacy of Khartoum’s earlier 
heavy subcontracting of Nuer militias to secure 
oil fields and weaken Garang’s Dinka-led SPLA. 
These had been brought onto the payroll, and 
their commanders given substantial material 
reward, during the CPA interim period. This 
was crucial to achieving independence. But it 
meant that ethnic Nuer fighters outnumbered 
others in the SPLA as a whole. To counter this 
threat and strengthen his own position within 
the conglomerate, Kiir began mobilizing more 
recruits from his home region of Bahr el 
Ghazal. These ‘Mathiang Anyoor’ and ‘Dut Ku 
Beny’ paramilitary forces, as they were known, 
were not integrated into the formal army, and 
initially operated under parallel command and 
control. These mobilizations initially occurred 
in the escalating standoff between Juba and 
Khartoum, including the brief border war in 
April 2012. Many of the Mathiang Anyoor were 
first recruited using the political logic of 
defending their land and border. Kiir then 
began directly financing the groups to keep 
them active and mobilized as the leadership 
crisis in the SPLM escalated.27  
The SPLM’s decision to cut off South Sudan’s 
oil production in 2012 substantially weakened 
Kiir’s ability to manage the internal divisions by 
curtailing the resources available to him. This 
was compounded by the fact that Kiir created 
common ground between his rivals – Machar, 
as well as the group of Garang loyalists who 
had pushed the GoRSS towards confrontation 
with Khartoum. In mid-2013, Kiir expelled the 
 
 
In the security arena, therefore, the 
outcome was akin to that of a 
weakly regulated monopsony, that 
is, a market with a single buyer for 
security services. 
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competing forces from the government, 
removing Machar as vice president and other 
competitors as government ministers. 
However, he did not revoke their SPLM party 
membership and they chose not to leave the 
party, instead pressing their bid for leadership 
of the SPLM as the most credible route to state 
power. The power struggle was initially played 
out within the party.  
Note that in South Sudan’s political system 
from the CPA signature up to 2013, the army 
(SPLA) was the senior entity; the party (SPLM ) 
was next most important, and the government 
was the junior.   
In a move that was both offensive and 
defensive in nature, Kiir quietly deployed the 
Bahr el Ghazal paramilitary forces to Juba to 
strengthen his position as the crisis within 
SPLM escalated throughout 2013, culminating 
in the National Liberation Council meeting of 
the SPLM in 2013. The factions allied to 
Machar, as well as other competing coalitions, 
boycotted the meeting. 
Level of analysis Account 
Political economy 
After an initial period of consolidation post-independence, the stopping of oil production in 
2011 by the GoRSS caused a fiscal crisis: South Sudan was a rentier system deprived of rent. 
This was compounded by Kiir’s political mismanagement, where he allowed his rivals to form 
an alliance against him. Most parties, however, anticipated that the flow of political funds 
would resume shortly.   
Structure of political 
firms and strategies 
After independence, the GoRSS had been organized as a fictive conglomerate, which disguised 
a loosely collusive oligopoly – thrown together in the pursuit of common ends, and because of 
external pressure. The effect of the fiscal crisis, Kiir’s political miscalculations and finally, the 
achievement of independence (which had long been a strategic goal of the SPLM/A) meant 
that Kiir’s position began to be seen as open to challenge. This situation was exacerbated by 
the lack of any informal means or norms of mediating competition within the SPLM/A 
conglomerate.  
Organization of the 
security arena 
In the years after the CPA, and immediately after independence, Kiir spent massively on 
expanding the military payroll to make it too expensive for the GoS to rent southern militia. In 
the security arena, therefore, the outcome was akin to that of a weakly regulated monopsony, 
that is, a market with a single buyer for security services. With the onset of fiscal crisis, the 
parties began to organize themselves into a rivalrous oligopoly, anticipating the imminent 
return of centralized political rents.  
Table 5: 2012-13: Fiscal shock and transformation of the political system 
 
Figure 1: 2012-13: Transformation of political system after fiscal shock 
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To sum up, shutting down of oil production 
resulted in a major shock to the South 
Sudanese political market. A rentier system 
was deprived of rents, and as a result, a 
process of centralized allocation of oil rents 
was no longer able to manage rivalries within 
the governing conglomerate. This crisis was 
exacerbated by Kiir’s political miscalculations. 
At the same time, the actors anticipated a 
return of centralized rents and organized 
themselves as a rivalrous oligopolistic system. 
3.2. First Stage of the War to ARCSS  
(December 2013-August 2015)   
In December 2013, forces allied to Kiir’s faction 
launched a campaign of extreme political 
violence against Nuer, ending the leadership 
crisis in the SPLM by expelling Kiir’s main 
challengers out of the political centre and into  
the political periphery. This act finally dissolved 
any pretence of a  dominant conglomerate, and 
instead a segmented market emerged: at one 
level, the South Sudanese political market 
consisted of a rivalrous oligopoly between two 
conglomerates – one led by Kiir's government 
in Juba, which formed a partnership with 
Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni, and the 
other a competing conglomerate under Riek 
Machar which obtained finance from the 
government in Khartoum. The latter was to 
become the SPLA-In Opposition (SPLA-IO)—a 
name chosen to indicate that its leaders were 
Level of analysis Account 
Political 
economy 
There were two main sources of rent/political finance in this period. The first was oil 
which still provided the most substantial income for the state and politicians, even 
though revenues were much lower than before. The second consisted of security 
payments and/or in-kind assistance from Khartoum (to SPLA-IO) and military assistance 
from Uganda to the GoRSS in return for payments. Minor sources included some funds 
obtained from cross border smuggling and dealing in aid. Overall, political finance was in 
short supply, and the sources of political finance were not aligned - Sudan and Uganda 
were sponsoring rival political factions.  
Structure of 
political firms 
and strategies 
In a market where political finance was in short supply, political firms organized 
themselves so as to best take advantage of the anticipated return of centralized rents. A 
segmented market emerged in South Sudan during this period. On one hand, a rivalrous 
oligopoly emerged between two conglomerates – one led by Kiir's government in Juba, 
which formed a joint partnership with Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni, and the other 
a competing conglomerate under Riek Machar which obtained some finance from the 
government in Khartoum. At another level, South Sudan resembled a poorly regulated 
free market with proliferation of smaller armed groups, and short-term opportunistic deal-
making.   
Neither conglomerate had access to enough finance to form stable bargains with smaller 
armed groups, and other strategies began to come to the fore: extremely conspicuous 
forms of violence (often ethnically targeted), strengthening of identity-based political 
mobilization, etc.   
Organization of 
the security 
arena 
Although smaller armed groups proliferated, the security arena operated as a poorly 
funded duopsony - the two conglomerates remained the major buyers of military services 
from smaller armed groups, even though they were reduced to bargaining on the basis of 
anticipated future rents.  
The GoRSS gained steadily in the conflict as its sources of political financing were more 
stable. External peacemakers continued to treat the SPLA-IO as an equal to the 
government, ignoring/misreading the political dynamics in South Sudan which resulted in 
collapse of peace initiatives such as the ARCSS.  
Table 6: 2013-15: Civil war and a bankrupt, segmented political market 
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still laying claim to the legitimacy bestowed by 
the name SPLA. This can also be understood 
as a duopsony because the market was still 
split between two superior firms, the Juba-
Kampala partnership and Khartoum-financed 
SPLA-IO, which acted as buyers of services 
from smaller armed groups. A second level of 
the political market could be observed among 
smaller armed groups, as this period witnessed 
the emergence of a poorly regulated ‘free 
market’ characterized by  (a) a proliferation of 
new armed groups (sub-contractors), and (b) 
weak(er) contract types (compared to the prior 
period), and more frequent rounds of 
bargaining.  
The smaller armed groups proliferated due to 
both an uptick in supply due to the dissolved 
relationships within the SPLM/A, lowered 
barriers to entry into the market for new armed 
actors, and a substantial increase in demand. 
However, not all armed groups were in equal 
demand. Firms with the asset-specificity 
sought by Khartoum performed better as the 
GoS did not weigh groups equally and 
preferred financing in zones of influence, which 
were determined through a combination of 
historical links, presence of strategic assets, 
and proximate distance. In some cases, supply 
outstripped demand, despite the market 
competition – the beginnings of a market 
trend. Emerging armed groups in Equatoria 
and outside Wau, for instance, struggled to 
align themselves with one of the 
conglomerates. Many actually failed to 
operationalize – existing in name only. Other 
smaller groups did manage to commence 
operations, but struck weak deals which 
involved little to no resource compensation. 
The weak contracts between Riek Machar's IO 
core superior firm and the IO's aligned 
subcontractors were both a cause and effect 
 Pre ARCSS ARCSS ARCSS collapse revitalization 
Number of organizations  22 36 42 43 
Figure 4: Civil War (2013-18) – a segmented, bankrupt market 
 
Armed Organization Numbers 
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of the negligible resource flows to these 
contractors. Riek Machar supplied groups 
which were closely aligned with him (and 
which he trusted) with the limited resources 
which he was able to obtain from Khartoum. 
As a result, he had limited control over other 
armed groups. 
Two main forces kept the market grouped into 
two main conglomerates. First, the market 
functioned as a duopsony in which each 
conglomerate was still reasonably regulated 
internally, and the two conglomerates 
remained the major buyers of military services 
from smaller armed groups. As a result, the 
security environment remained risky for 
subcontractors who sought to compete 
outside either conglomerate. 
Secondly, the external peace process created 
an expectation that future rents would be 
channeled through a centralized state, as had 
been the case in the past. In this sense, the 
peace process acted as a form of regulation on 
the political market. The peace process was 
launched within days of the outbreak of 
violence, by IGAD foreign ministers supported 
by the AU, UN and western governments. The 
mediators’ immediate objective was to restore 
the status quo ante existing the day before the 
outbreak of the war, that is, wind back the 
clock to the time in which the dispute was 
purely political and contained within the 
political mechanisms of the SPLM. The 
mediators then grafted on to this the standard 
template for an ethno-territorial armed conflict, 
namely a division of power, territory and 
resources based on an assumption that the 
war is a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ in which 
the disposition of forces and territory at the 
time of appraisal is not going to change. This 
led to an odd situation of the mediators 
simultaneously advocating for reconciliation 
within the SPLM (reconstituting the dominant 
party) and also for a model based on power 
sharing and territorial separation. 
South Sudanese actors watched the peace 
process for clues on market direction much as 
bonds traders closely scrutinize all hints from 
the Federal Reserve and (in earlier days) 
monopolist companies were wary of the 
Federal Trade Commission. This was finally 
formalized with the outline of a deal struck in 
early 2014 in which a formal duopoly would re-
constituted (the two armies would be re-
integrated and the corresponding political 
parties would be organized to prepare for 
elections). Of course, sometimes, mere signals 
were not enough, and strong external pressure 
were required to compel armed actors to 
comply with the envisaged peace formulae. 
When the Shilluk militia Agwelek under warlord 
commander Johnson Olony defected in mid-
2015, he received strong pressure to join 
SPLM-IO and stay within the framework of the 
to-be-signed peace deal. 
The rewards from the prospective political 
settlement were speculative in nature but were 
comprised predominantly of future positions in 
the state: government and party positions on 
the political side, ranks on the military side.  It 
was thought that fewer positions were likely to 
be created in the 'political' space than in the 
military space, as the numbers of government 
positions were understood as conscribed, 
whereas number of military positions was 
thought to be more elastic. The recent history 
of profligate absorption of armed groups and 
rank inflation among officers, following the 
2006 Juba Agreement may also have 
influenced expectations among the different 
political groups. This expectation of future 
rents, in addition to the market demand 
created by the competition for their services, 
strengthened the bargaining positions for 
specialists of violence compared to ‘political’ 
subcontractors, who were better described as 
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specialists in external relations, administration, 
or other fields and who, additionally, had 
greater career flexibility. The ratio of specialists 
of violence to ‘political’ specialists in the South 
Sudanese political market expanded as a 
result, especially in the SPLA-IO conglomerate, 
which relied more heavily on the likelihood of 
future rents than on immediate political 
payments.  
This period’s marketplace never stabilized. 
Juba gained steadily in the conflict due to its 
structural advantages which led to a steady 
gain in its market share. While the SPLA-IO 
likely possessed greater manpower at the 
beginning of the war, Kiir possessed the better 
market prospects. Whereas Juba retained its 
own source of revenue in the form of sovereign 
rents, the SPLA-IO depended entirely on 
secondary financing. Juba’s rents vastly 
outstripped the SPLA-IO’s in value, kind, and 
sustainability. Juba’s rents were primarily oil 
revenue (albeit at a lower level than before the 
war).28 These oil flows created a common 
interest with Khartoum, which benefited from 
transit payments and associated payments, 
which created a further opportunity for Pres. 
Kiir and Pres. al-Bashir to make private 
financial agreements, bypassing the GoRSS 
treasury. Juba also benefited from the foreign 
exchange components of one of the world’s 
largest humanitarian operations, and its 
sources of political funding proved to be 
greater in value, much more liquid, and also 
proved longer lasting and less subject to 
regional and international shifts. Analyses of 
the conflict describing it as a proxy war 
between Sudan and Uganda, an analysis which 
heavily informed peace efforts, were therefore 
partly misguided, since there was strong 
asymmetry between SPLA-IO’s reliance on 
external support and Juba’s weaker reliance on 
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production at a discounted rate to secure short-
more diverse external backing over the 
medium to long term.  
Interviews by one of the authors in Machar’s 
core base of support suggests that his 
supporters did not fully appreciate these new 
dynamics of ‘sovereign’ rents, instead viewing 
the war for supremacy as a repeat of the 
unwinnable ethnic split in the SPLA in the 
1990s. There are no clear signs that Machar, 
either, fully understood the ramifications of this 
new imbalance. Machar failed to diversify his 
external support for a longer war or strike an 
early deal before his position eroded. Further, 
he did not take steps to integrate his 
conglomerate for the long-run or was unable to 
strike bargains which were stable enough to do 
so. As his position steadily weakened, 
Machar’s ability to direct a strategic war 
withered. 
In a sense, then, the original move to expel the 
Nuer armed groups/factions from the SPLM/A 
conglomerate was ultimately effective, if 
brutally so. Kiir succeeded in forcing his main 
competitors out of the ruling arrangement. 
Furthermore, the extreme violence used by 
forces aligned with him made a negotiated 
return to the conglomerate extremely difficult 
for those Nuer armed groups during the period 
when the SPLA-IO’s bargaining power was 
greatest.  Absent this extreme violence, the 
pressure to reunite the SPLM/A 
conglomerate—and threaten Kiir’s hold on the 
SPLM/A—would likely have proven difficult to 
resist.  
Over time, Kiir’s market position declined in an 
absolute sense (his political finance was 
reduced) but he gained relative to all 
competitors. This should disabuse the notion 
that the war is ‘senseless’ to all parties; to Kiir  
and allied firms, the war achieved the objective  
term political funding – later signing less-than-
favorable terms with Sudan for the same reason.  
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of consolidating his position by fending off the 
internal threat to his rule within the 
conglomerate. This was achieved at great and  
continuing cost. Still, the winner-take-all nature 
of South Sudan's politics and the likelihood of 
obtaining indefinite sovereign rents as the 
dominant player in the South Sudanese 
political market may have incentivized Kiir’s 
extreme actions. 
The peace process failed to adapt to this 
shifting market, placing it increasingly out of 
step with the market dynamics, and making 
the mediators into advocates for their template 
rather than facilitators of a political process 
among the contending political-military elites. 
Over time, Machar became reliant on external 
actors to buttress his weak market position. At 
the same time, he continued to be treated as 
an equal of the GoRSS in the IGAD peace 
process. Kiir’s firm recognized this and 
resented it, leading to rising hostility between it 
and the external peacemakers, which had to 
rely on escalating coercive pressure to get the 
peace deal signed.  
3.3. ARCSS (August 2015-July 2016)  
The Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed in 
August 2015 by Machar and a conspicuously 
reluctant Pres. Kiir, who felt that he had military 
options in his favour, and who resented what 
he saw as an unfair allocation of power (such 
as governorships of oil-producing states) to the 
SPLA-IO. 
This period was characterized by the following 
market conditions: continued proliferation of 
smaller armed groups (subcontractors) due to 
increasing supply of willing manpower and 
more favourable market conditions; 
strengthened contracts; and further 
consolidation into the two competing 
conglomerates.  
There was a notable proliferation of 
speculative subcontractors seeking to align 
themselves with the SPLA-IO conglomerate.  
This is primarily due to the fact that the 
formalization of the peace deal recognized the 
SPLA-IO as the sole partner in the government 
of national unity on a near-equal basis to the 
GoRSS. The SPLA-IO was thereby (a) the sole 
recognized alternative to the GoRSS/SPLM and 
(b) was promised positions and resources that 
were far greater than its existing political and 
military capacity. In effect, this was an effort to 
replicate the formula for the north-south 
political settlement of the CPA period, with two 
recognized and dominant political-military 
actors sharing sovereign rents and dividing 
control over the security arena. In turn, the 
anticipation of future rents from association 
with either dominant actor, incentivized 
entrepreneurism among armed groups and 
strengthened the bargains struck between the 
SPLA-IO and subcontractor firms.  
In effect, the peace deal, once signed, granted 
Machar a promissory note from the 
government,  ‘guaranteed’ by the regulators, for 
an unbound number of positions in the future 
military. Machar leveraged this promise of 
 
Coalition 
Characteristics First stage of the war to ARCSS 
 Absorbed Aligned 
Quasi-
aligned 
SPLA 3 3 2 
IO 2 3 2 
    
Coalition 
Characteristics 
ARCSS period 
 Absorbed Aligned 
Quasi-
aligned 
SPLA 2 4 3 
IO 2 12 3 
24          The Security Arena in South Sudan   
future positions to seed new groups and 
recapitalize old allies—using future military 
ranks as a prize to obtain more services from 
specialists in violence. This recapitalization 
further strengthened Machar’s informal 
contracts with existing subcontracting groups.  
The government conglomerate, meanwhile, 
shrank, as a result of the power-sharing agreed 
in the peace deal, which awarded it a smaller 
proportion of future positions compared to its 
then-existing dominance of the political-
military marketplace. This created some 
market disruption, such as in Western 
Equatoria, where the sacking of Governor 
Joseph Bakosoro resulted in two armed 
groups having to try and re-negotiate their 
bargains. (One eventually aligned with the 
government but remains ‘negotiating’; the other 
with the SPLA-IO.)29  
Immediately following the signing of the 
ARCSS, Pres. Kiir unilaterally decreed a major 
constitutional change, Presidential 
Establishment Order 36/2015 of October 2015, 
which created 28 states to replace the existing 
ten. (Later the number was further expanded to 
32.) This was a transparent attempt by the 
GoRSS to (a) reward its clients who were 
shortchanged by the provisions of the ARCSS, 
(b) generally increase the GoRSS payroll and 
the number of positions that could be awarded 
to followers, and (c) put strategic locations 
such as oilfields and militarily important 
locations under the control of governors newly 
appointed by Kiir.30 Interestingly, neither the 
SPLA-IO nor the international sponsors of 
ARCSS did more than issue pro forma protests 
against this blatantly unconstitutional act. The 
mediators acquiesced because they feared 
challenging a government already reluctant to 
implement a peace accord the government felt 
awarded too much to its opponents. The SPLA-
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IO leadership has not accepted the proposal 
for the subdivision of states, but its opposition 
has been muted because although the new 
arrangement advantaged the GoRSS more 
than it did them, it also conferred increased 
opportunities for placing SPLA-IO 
subcontractors in positions of controlling local 
resources or receiving state payouts. Indeed, in 
2014 the SPLA-IO had itself proposed a 21-
state federal formula for this reason. 
The SPLA-IO’s 2014 proposal had also 
contained a far more radical proposal, which 
would have transformed the existing formula 
for controlling the oil revenues. The existing 
formula, inherited from the CPA was that oil 
revenues were paid first to the central 
government which then allocated a share (2 
percent) to each oil producing state. The SPLA-
IO proposed reversing this, so that the states 
would receive the money directly, keep most of 
it, and remit the remainder to Juba. This would 
have amounted to de facto fiscal 
confederation: making the centre financially 
subordinate to the federal sub-units, and dealt 
a death blow to a central state within a political 
market system. Kiir closed down discussion of 
this kind of federalism. Machar’s challenge on 
this front may also have prompted Kiir to 
redraw the maps: under the 21 states that 
Machar proposed, the key oil producing areas 
would stay largely in ethnic Nuer territory. In 
Kiir’s 28 states, much of the oil fields were 
instead drawn into the boundaries Dinka-
dominated states.  
This period's political market was highly 
unstable. Faced with its own shrinking 
conglomerate and the exaggerated value of the 
futures market within the SPLA-IO for 
specialists in violence, the government 
attempted to heavily curtail the new SPLA-IO 
conglomerate's size through extreme violence 
30 De Waal and Pendle 2018. 
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(reducing human numbers through killing). 
Areas with the emergent armed actors aligned 
with the SPLA-IO faced escalating coercive 
tensions, most notably in parts of Equatoria 
and near Wau.  
The peace deal did not reconstitute the 
conglomerate that had existed prior to the 
outbreak of civil war. Nor did it create a 
collusive duopoly. Behind the façade of such a 
cooperative arrangement, what took shape 
was a highly competitive arrangement where 
the SPLM and SPLA-IO agreed to terms that 
pitted the two conglomerates against each 
other for future control of state power 
following winner-take-all elections. The deal, in 
effect, directed a future hostile takeover of one 
conglomerate by the other, with a footnoted 
‘TBD’ on which conglomerate would be in a 
position to make a realistic bid for dominant 
position. This winner-take-all electoral model 
remains the preferred external tool for 
resolving the conflict despite its departure from 
the ‘big tent’ model of South Sudan from 2005-
13 within the SPLM.  While many South 
Sudanese and external observers expected the 
parties to reconstitute a nominally 
conglomerate form of government, the 
elections roadmap instead perpetuated the 
2013 competition among elites, and 
particularly between Kiir’s Dinka Bahr el Ghazal 
militia and Machar’s Nuer militia. The ARCSS 
peace agreement was at odds with itself, 
structuring a temporary return to a unity 
government to be followed by winner-take-all 
elections between its parts. (These 
components are essentially unchanged with 
the R-ARCSS.) 
ARCSS therefore faced two primary market-
based challenges: (a) its framework was at 
odds with actual market empirics, therefore 
requiring heavy external intervention or 
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regulation to hold it together, and (b) the new 
duopoly/partnership the ARCSS constructed 
was an exotic construction of contradictory 
logics, a creation of external political 
engineering—to be precise, an accretion of 
several ad hoc formulae, none of them 
sufficiently analyzed, and all of them inflexible 
in the face of changing circumstances. Such 
exotic, artificial structures possess their own 
heightened risks due to complexity, opacity, 
and unpredictability. 
The ARCSS framework arrangement, subject to 
these destabilizing cross-pressures and 
counterincentives, and increasingly out of 
touch with the real market positions of the 
actors, could only have held if backed up by 
sustained and heavy external pressure. Even 
then, it was likely to fail, and soon collapsed.  
3.4. ARCSS Collapse (July 2016-December 
2017)   
In July 2016, the peace deal collapsed. The two 
competing superior firms in Juba clashed 
heavily, and the GoRSS expelled the SPLA-IO. 
Violent clashes then erupted around the 
country, with violence especially acute around 
the new armed groups that had emerged 
during the ARCSS period.31 Following the 
SPLA-IO’s expulsion, the US and regional allies 
instituted and took strong new measures 
against the SPLA-IO superior firm and its 
leader, Riek Machar, who was exiled 
involuntarily under house arrest in South Africa. 
Meanwhile, the international mediators and 
guarantors of the ARCSS acquiesced to the de 
facto dissolution of the existing arrangement in 
favour of the GoRSS monopoly. This took the 
form of agreeing to the GoRSS-sponsored faux 
takeover of the SPLA-IO by Taban Deng. Under 
pressure from the US, Khartoum pulled back as 
a financial backer of the SPLA-IO, most of 
which remained with Machar. This formula did 
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not work. The fact that the internationals 
veered from promoting a power-sharing 
formula that gave too much weight to Machar 
and the IO, to one that was precisely the 
opposite, suggests that they did not have a 
cogent analysis of the power dynamics at play. 
This period was characterized by the following 
market conditions: A collapse in the regulatory 
framework; proliferation of speculative rival 
firms aspiring to the superior position enjoyed 
previously by the SPLA-IO conglomerate; 
weakening of contract types in the opposition.  
The end of the ARCSS framework ushered in a 
period of free competition, especially on the 
opposition side. Smaller armed groups no 
longer had any incentives to remain aligned to 
the SPLA-IO, because such alignment was not 
likely to lead to a share of future sovereign 
rents. However, because of severe economic 
and fiscal crisis, the GoRSS lacked the political 
budget to buy them into the ruling coalition. 
The result was a de facto market collapse. It 
was marked by instability, renegotiation of 
existing bargains, and a proliferation of 
speculative new armed groups, creating 
market fragmentation as entrepreneurs tried to 
raise funds to enter the deregulated market 
and take advantage of an excess cheap supply 
of military labour. In other words, at this time 
barriers to entry into the South Sudanese 
political market were very low, and there were a 
large number of armed men eager to offer their 
services to political-military entrepreneurs at 
very low cost.  
This attempt by regulators to legitimize a 
government conglomerate was, in some terms, 
relatively successful: the opposition’s external 
backing crumbled and the SPLA-IO remained 
under a de facto arms embargo from the 
region. Yet, the government failed to 
consolidate its position in the market despite 
these favourable regulatory conditions. The 
likely reasons for this is that it simply did not 
have the necessary resources to overcome the 
deep ‘hostility tax’ levied against it by 
opposition actors, while the Government of 
Sudan continued to undermine Juba by either 
sponsoring opposition groups, or sending 
signals that it would be ready to do so. 
This is a particularly interesting period for the 
study of political markets, because of the 
conditions of extreme conditions of political 
funding under which the political market 
operated. Why didn’t the SPLA-IO, without an 
external backer and facing a suddenly 
deregulated sector with emerging rival armed 
groups, lose its position as the primary 
opposition group, as external sponsors of 
peace processes clearly intended and hoped? 
First, none of the SPLA-IO’s rivals succeeded in 
securing significant internal resources or 
external financing. Second, these groups could 
not combine to constitute a conglomerate that 
laid credible claim to the status of partner in 
the ARCSS (which remained the framework for 
organizing externally-recognized political 
power, also known as sovereignty). The 
smaller political-military entities and new 
entrants to the market were therefore seeking 
Coalition 
Characteristics 
(ARCSS period) 
 Absorbed Aligned 
Quasi-
aligned 
Non-
aligned 
SPLA 2 4 3 0 
IO 2 12 3 0 
Independents 0 0 0 2 
     
Coalition 
Characteristics 
(ARCSS collapse period) 
 Absorbed Aligned 
Quasi-
aligned 
Non-
aligned 
SPLA 1 7 4 0 
IO 3 8 8 0 
Independents  - -  - 12 
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to increase their value vis-à-vis the principal 
buyers of political allegiance, namely the 
GoRSS and Khartoum, in the hope that this 
would strengthen their position in the political 
marketplace, at a future time in which that 
market became better financed and more 
robust. 
The SPLA-IO still held two main advantages 
over any challengers within the opposition. 
First, the costs of switching allegiance to other 
conglomerates, in many cases, proved greater 
than the net benefit for the SPLA-IO 
subcontractors. Secondly, despite sending 
mixed signals about their support for the 
political arrangements envisaged by the 
ARCSS, the external actors continued to 
recognize the ARCSS as the legitimate peace 
agreement, and SPLA-IO remained the official 
signatory to the peace deal. This meant that 
SPLA-IO was believed to have greater claim on 
shared sovereign rents, if the peace agreement 
were revived in some form.   
This period is also interesting because, during 
this period, the flow of funds into the South 
Sudanese political marketplace dried up. The 
chief characteristic of this collapse in political 
finance was the drop in effective demand for 
subcontractors. On the side of the GoRSS, 
effective demand for subcontracted services 
was minimal as the government lacked the 
resources to pay salaries or the political budget 
to finance anything but its core patronage 
network. In the opposition, competing aspirant 
firms competed ruthlessly for subcontractors, 
but all lacked the political budgets to provide 
more than token one-off payments (rumoured 
in the single-digit thousands for the leader of a 
small armed group with a core group of 
fighters numbering in the tens). These one-off 
payments landed far short of viable operational 
budgets. The primary value purchased by the 
superior firms in these cases were the press 
releases declaring allegiance that soon 
followed, whose target audience were the 
external peacemakers. In other words, the 
market for subcontracted armed groups 
collapsed to the extent that it became a market 
for public relations rather than operational 
services. 
Many of these smaller armed groups were, in a 
sense, languishing in the ultimate 'bargain bin' 
and yet found no major market takers — and 
yet, still they proliferated and largely resisted 
better, though meagre, offers from the 
government. Why? In part, the government was 
now too weak to effectively intervene (whether 
through the use of money or violence) in the 
market to prevent shoe-string rebellions. This 
may also be a case, however, where in the total 
collapse of political finance, other political 
logics — primarily the solidarity of identity 
groups in the face of ethnic atrocities, in the 
case of Central Equatorians, or over the 
occupation or annexation of land, as in the 
case of the Shilluk of Upper Nile, Fertit outside 
Wau, and Ma’di in Eastern Equatoria — rose to 
the fore. That other political logics would 
predominate in the extreme collapse of this 
political market is not necessarily a surprising 
finding. These populist, identity-based political 
logics were already strong forces propelling 
the increase and lowering costs of manpower 
supply for new armed groups; these supply-
side forces became all the more dominant in 
the market as the demand-side of the market 
collapsed. Smaller armed groups turned 
increasingly to other revenue and rent 
generating activities as a result, including 
checkpoint extortion and localized resource 
extraction. 
The strength of identity politics also allowed 
Machar to fend off the hostile takeover bid 
from within his conglomerate from Taban 
Deng Gai, who was allied with the government 
and had relatively larger political funds. Taban 
and his group were derogatively labeled ‘the 
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Nuer of (Dinka) money’, a moral charge that 
was effective in discounting the political value 
of his otherwise-healthy political budget.32 As a 
result, there was a steep reputational cost for 
other Nuer groups to align with Taban. Machar 
was largely cut off by his Khartoum financiers 
due to strong US sanctions pressures, and 
confined to South Africa, a strong public signal 
by the external regulators who hoped to signal 
their de-recognition of SPLA-IO’s claim to 
future state power and accompanying rents. 
Nonetheless, Machar retained control of most 
of the SPLA-IO conglomerate. Still, even 
despite his political toxicity, Taban did slowly 
amass enough followers to stay relevant. 
Kiir continued to supply and arm his soldiers 
even as he was no longer able to finance their 
full salaries. This was because of (a) the 
increased importance off-books funding of 
military operations through parastatal oil 
institutions, humanitarian rents such as aid 
diversions and checkpoints, monetary rents 
through foreign exchange manipulation, and 
other illicit financing such as checkpoints, and 
(b) the encroaching shadow of Nile Basin 
politics revolving around the Egypt-Ethiopia 
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dispute. The off-books financing of the war 
prioritized material support over on-book salary 
payments, in part because arms deals and 
contract financing are also tools of elite 
patronage. Egypt meanwhile became Juba’s 
biggest external material backer, including 
through provision of suspected arms supplies 
and military training. Kiir’s reliance on an 
increasingly illiquid regional ‘barter’ political 
economy resulted in the continued ability to 
operationally wage war while struggling to 
finance patronage peace, yet another ironic 
tragedy of South Sudan’s war. 
3.5. ‘Revitalization’ (December 2017–
September 2018)  
As the war continued to spread despite the 
collapse of the failed ARCSS regulatory regime, 
the external actors initiated a new round of 
peace talks. Proliferation of both smaller 
armed groups as well as those seeking to 
challenge the position of the SPLA-IO had 
mostly halted since the reconvening of peace 
talks in December 2017. 
The peace proposals envisaged a position for 
the SPLA-IO as well as a third group of 
Coalition Characteristics (ARCSS collapse) 
 Absorbed Aligned Quasi-aligned non-aligned 
SPLA 1 7 4 - 
IO 3 8 8 - 
Independents  0 0 0  12 
     
Coalition Characteristics (Revitalization) 
 Absorbed Aligned Quasi-aligned non-aligned 
SPLA 1 7 4 - 
IO 3 8 9 - 
NAS 5 (integrated) 5  - -  
Independents      2 
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‘independent’ armed groups that eventually 
coalesced into the South Sudan Opposition 
Alliance (SSOA)—the latter was made up of the 
different groups which had sought to challenge 
the SPLA-IO but failed to do so meaningfully. 
During this period, SPLA-IO was able to strike 
more stable bargains with smaller armed 
groups, which were seeking to align with it in 
search of the ever-elusive but tantalizing 
sovereign rents.    
There was one major exception to this 
externally imposed market structure: General 
Paul Malong, Kiir’s former army chief and 
military strongman, formed a new opposition 
group from exile in Nairobi. The timing was 
somewhat fortuitous. Malong had privately 
begun to mobilize an opposing armed group, 
hoping to challenge the GoRSS and the SPLA-
IO during the ARCSS collapse period but could 
not publicly do so until he was exiled in late 
2017. Malong did not actually defect but was 
rather pushed out by Kiir as an internal threat, 
and in this, Malong’s case most closely 
resembles Kiir’s original expulsion of Machar in 
2013, except this was achieved without resort 
to conspicuous violence. 
In this period, both Kiir and Machar’s original 
ethnic-based conglomerates further weakened 
amid the collapse of political financing in the 
market. As elites lost patronage and popular 
discontent rose amid extreme economic 
hardship, ethnic politics changed character, 
with a decline in the salience of the larger 
ethnic groupings. The declining logic of a zero-
sum power struggle over resources also 
diminished the political logic of the major 
ethnic blocs, as Kiir no longer appeared 
immediately threatened by Machar, nor did 
Machar appear plausibly on the cusp of victory 
to his followers. Communitarian political logics 
did not subside, but the constituent sectarian, 
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clan, and communal segments started to 
unglue within the bigger ‘Dinka’ and ‘Nuer’ 
political firms.  In Unity State, the GoRSS was 
able to turn an increasing number of Nuer 
groups against the SPLA-IO, partly through 
cash payments and partly through licensing 
them to raid cattle, loot and pillage, as they 
conducted offensives against their near 
neighbours. In the Dinka areas of Warrap and 
Lakes, violent local conflicts have flared among 
groups aligned with the GoRSS. 
4. R-ARCSS (September 2018–November 
2019)33  
Following the collapse of the first ARCSS 
during 2016 and the unsuccessful attempts to 
marginalize Machar, it became evident to IGAD 
and the Troika that peace in South Sudan 
required the active engagement of Khartoum 
and perhaps even Sudanese leadership of the 
process. As a result, in the lead-up to the R-
ARCSS there was a sharp change in IGAD’s 
mediation tactics. This was driven by (a) 
leadership changes in Ethiopia and new PM 
Abiy Ahmed’s subsequent failed attempts to 
reconcile Kiir and Machar; combined with, (b) 
the subsequent active role played by Pres. al-
Bashir, who took leadership of the process 
after reaching a new understanding with Pres. 
Museveni of Uganda.34 On 25 June 2018, Pres. 
al-Bashir facilitated negotiations between Kiir 
and Machar (which took the form of proximity 
talks on Sudanese proposals). 
Facing a major macro-economic crisis, 
Khartoum had a clear material interest in South 
Sudan’s peace, specifically in the reopening of 
the Unity oilfields and the fees that would 
accrue to Sudan from use of the pipeline. Joint 
Sudanese-South Sudanese control over the 
oilfields would also give Khartoum its own 
military and intelligence presence on the routes 
34 International Crisis Group 2019. 
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used to supply the SPLM-North and other 
Sudanese rebels. The deal-making also 
increased Sudan’s standing in western capitals, 
especially Washington DC. 
The reconciliation process drew on Pres. al-
Bashir’s (and NISS director General Salah 
Gosh’s) close knowledge of the South 
Sudanese parties and material leverage, even 
though the two men were focused on short 
term gains and had other domestic 
distractions. Key elements of the final deal 
were not made public—for example those 
relating to the details of Sudanese supervision 
of South Sudanese security arrangements, and 
financial details of oil transshipment and other 
payments. Characteristically, the most difficult 
issues were left undecided, to allow for future 
bargaining by the parties. Among those issues 
left ambiguous were the number of states and 
the modalities of decentralization. The 
concrete elements of the deal included 
inducements of cantonment for armed groups 
as well as multiplying the available seats in the 
executive office, the cabinet and the 
parliament.  
The R-ACRSS is a paradigmatic political 
marketplace deal, carefully designed to bring a 
broad swathe of South Sudan’s political-
military elite into a political settlement, each 
individual rewarded in accordance with his 
political weight, with additional resources for 
the needed political payout obtained from 
increased oil production. Further, and in 
common with other Sudanese and South 
Sudanese peace agreements, the R-ARCSS 
consists of an elaborate document and a 
backroom pact. Few among the South 
Sudanese elites and the public believed that R-
ARCSS would be implemented to the letter and 
that it would reform the nature of the political 
system. Indeed, no sooner had the 
                                                     
35 UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan 2019.  
Government of Sudan obtained its immediate 
rewards—financial deals associated with oil 
transhipment and future oil production, and 
reduced South Sudanese support for northern 
Sudanese rebels—than it lost interest in 
pursuing the implementation of the agreement, 
handing it off to IGAD. 
In effect, what the R-ARCSS sought to do was 
to normalize relations between Juba and 
Khartoum, aligning the different sources of 
political patronage and the current oil revenue. 
In other words, GoRSS has succeeded in 
confirming that it has unified the channels the 
sources of rent to itself and therefore can 
begin to re-establish a centralized authoritarian 
kleptocracy. It is doing this on the Sudanese 
model with the strengthened National Security 
Service (NSS) controlling the companies that 
manage oil contracts and other key sources of 
political funding.35 In some ways, this can even 
be understood as a return to the politics of the 
CPA period, but at much lower levels of 
finance, and after a brutal war which makes 
the establishment of a unified political market 
much more difficult (as discussed above). 
The interests and engagement of the GoS in 
South Sudan’s peace were short term and 
tactical: to secure funds. Khartoum’s attention 
span was short. Even before the overthrow of 
Pres. al-Bashir in April 2019, the administration 
of the peace deal began to shift from 
Khartoum to the international actors. This also 
represented a shift from focusing on the elite 
pact towards a by-the-book implementation of 
the provisions of R-ARCSS, and as a result may 
reduce the flexibility available to South 
Sudanese political actors. The characteristic 
South Sudanese/Sudanese approach to peace-
making involves recurrent delays and 
postponing tricky issues. The internationals are  
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Level of analysis Account 
Political economy 
As described above, much of the civil war period was characterized by low availability of 
political finance. The funds that did exist were being used by Sudan and Uganda to sponsor 
rival political factions. Alignment of external flows was only finally achieved in 2018 with the 
R-ARCSS, which allowed Uganda and Sudan to reach an arrangement about financial flows 
(in and out of South Sudan) and security behind the façade of a formal peace agreement. 
The R-ARCSS reduced the Sudan-Uganda rivalry, and in some senses, marks a return to the 
political economy of the CPA period, albeit at much lower levels of funding. Regime change 
in Sudan does not appear to have affected this with all parties seeking to maintain the status 
quo for opportunistic reasons. South Sudan is not a priority for any of the regional or middle-
eastern priorities which are occupied with other issues.  
Structure of political 
firms and strategies 
In the current period, the GoRSS has become recognized as the dominant military-political 
actor, controlling South Sudan’s sources of rent, and therefore is trying to re-establish a 
centralized authoritarian kleptocracy. It is doing this on the Sudanese model with the NSS 
controlling the companies that manage oil contracts. Pres. Kiir is also relying on the NSS and 
other para-military battalions to ‘coup-proof’ his regime.  
 
The SPLA-IO is looking to find an alternate sponsor, given the political turmoil in Sudan, but 
at present, does not seem to be finding too many takers. Some of the rivals to the SPLA-IO’s 
position are trying to negotiate their positions with the GoRSS, but currently remain outside 
the deal.   
Organization of the 
security arena 
The security arena remains unstable, and the current impasse is likely to be temporary. 
Opposition groups have struggled to recruit/mobilize supporters. This is because of a lack of 
liquid political funds, and because the promise of a share of future (remote) rents does not 
appear to be sufficient incentive in the face of extreme government violence. Some armed 
groups remain watchful, either (a) preferring to wait rather than commit to one coalition or 
another, or (b) unable to commit to the government given their mobilization in response to 
ethnically targeted government violence.  
Table 7: 2018 - 19: The R-ARCSS and the consolidation of the political market 
Figure 5: R-ARCSS and after (2018--) 
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more likely to insist on deadlines. This has the 
advantage that tricky issues may be faced 
head on, but that holds risks.   
Sudanese engagement in the implementation 
of the R-ARCSS began to slacken in October 
2018, Having accomplished its security goals 
and having achieved its core goal of restarting 
the flow of oil, the GoS lost interest in the 
implementation of the deal. The outcome was 
a shift in the centre of gravity of the mediation 
back to IGAD and the UN. Following the 
overthrow of al-Bashir, a number of 
internationally-sponsored or facilitated 
mechanisms for Sudan-South Sudan relations 
became suddenly more significant. Among 
these are: UNISFA and the mechanisms for 
managing Abyei; the joint border monitoring 
and verification mechanisms; and the Joint 
Political and Security Mechanism for managing 
relations between the two countries (facilitated 
by the AUHIP).   
In the security arena, attempted armed group 
recruitment has again increased after the 
peace agreement. This recruitment has been 
extensive and widespread, but the likelihood of 
future rents does not appear to have the same 
allure as during the ARCSS period. Some 
groups remain outside the peace deal, but not 
outside the political marketplace. Thomas 
Cirillo’s National Salvation Front (NAS) group is 
the main rebel group to refuse to sign the 
peace deal. Rather than agree to his demands, 
the government has sought to use a 
combination of violence against him in hopes 
of opening informal negotiations outside the 
purview of external regulators. The intention is 
to either signal the high costs of non-
alignment, failing which, the GoRSS hopes to 
break up his group. The lack of negotiations, or 
a forum, has limited Cirillo’s capacity to 
mobilize and strengthen command over his 
troops. 
The South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) 
conglomerate has split repeatedly as different 
factions struggle over its leadership, primarily 
the vice president position. The loss of its 
largest armed faction, in the form of Thomas 
Cirillo, and the death of one of its most 
competent generals, Peter Gatdet, has 
weakened SSOA and resulted in internecine 
struggles over the share allocated to it under 
the R-ARCSS. 
Some lessons can provisionally be drawn from 
this period. First, the logic of the marketplace 
held: the behaviour of the violent firms is as 
one would predict. Armed groups, civil society, 
and ceasefire monitors have reported rampant 
recruitment activities, as the firms attempt to 
leverage their future promised integration into 
real manpower, and therefore lasting political 
capital, on the ground. This recruitment spiked 
after the establishment of cantonment sites in 
the months ahead of the November 2019 
deadline to form a unity government (extended 
from May 2019). However, most of this 
expansion of numbers appears to have been 
on paper: the recruited troops have since 
dispersed from the cantonment sites 
(especially those recruited by the SPLM-IO). 
Paper recruitment is not necessarily benign, as 
it can act as the basis for mobilization if 
conflict recurs, but it is does indicate that both 
commanders and recruits are more skeptical 
about the value of future positions allocated 
under the R-ARCSS than under the ARCSS four 
years prior.  
There may be two explanations for this. First, 
opposition groups appear to completely lack 
liquid political funds. They continue to try and 
rely on the promise of future finance to flow 
from the operationalization of the integration 
provisions of R-ARCSS. Second, and related to 
this, the promise of future rents from the R-
ARCSS appear to count for far less than they 
did in the ARCSS period. This derives from an 
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understandable distrust in R-ARCSS 
implementation. The 2015 ARCSS had the full-
throated backing and financial support of 
Western donors, and South Sudanese still 
believed that the Troika ‘guaranteed’ its 
implementation. The 2016 ARCSS collapse, 
and subsequent abandonment of the political 
configuration envisaged in the ARCSS, has 
shifted the political calculation of all actors, 
particularly community elders and young men 
– who remain the primary target constituency 
for the recruitment process. These elders and 
youth now treat the promises of their elite with 
regard to future integration with greater 
suspicion.  
Actors also realize that there are major risks 
attached to such recruitment: fighters recruited 
into the SPLA-IO’s conglomerate in 2015-16, as 
well as their communities, faced extreme 
violence, and did not simply enjoy the fruits of 
the ARCSS without having to fight, as they had 
been promised. In sum, the likelihood of 
integration has substantially decreased while 
the perceived risks of recruitment and 
subsequent cantonment have increased. 
Further, neither the external sponsors of the 
peace process, nor Kiir was willing to invest 
significant funds in the cantonment process, 
seen as the first step in integration.  
What remains, therefore, is a peace deal built 
around a broken funding apparatus where 
South Sudan is not a policy priority for any of 
the countries of the region or beyond including 
Middle Eastern states that are showing a 
deepening interest in the Horn of Africa. In fact, 
for most of these countries, their policies 
towards South Sudan are derived from 
something else, such as the Nile Waters or 
positioning vis-à-vis Sudan or Ethiopia. As a 
result, even though members of the South 
Sudanese political-military elite will certainly be 
looking for alternative external sponsors, they 
are likely to find few takers. 
The South Sudanese political-security elite 
have all been conspicuously unenthusiastic 
about the democratic uprising in Sudan. Their 
historic antagonism towards the al-Bashir 
regime might have led an observer to expect 
that they would welcome a democratic 
revolution—indeed that was one of the historic 
objectives of the SPLM. However, all are far 
more interested in a continuation of business 
as normal. The quick and successful attempts 
to affirm support for the Transitional Military 
Council in Khartoum indicate this. Even though 
Kiir may have lost key elements of the 
backroom deal which underpinned the R-
ARCSS, a repeatedly-extended period of the 
‘pre-transitional’ status quo kept him in power 
longer with extended control over state 
resources. For Machar, the overthrow of Bashir 
meant that he has (a) lost his murky security 
guarantee, and (b) lost the external guarantor 
who had made it possible for him to wage war. 
As a result, extending the ‘pre-transitional’ 
status quo period allowed him time to study 
and reposition himself amid the unfolding 
situation in Khartoum, in the hope that a new 
sponsor may emerge as the TMC reverts to its 
traditional strategy of backing all horses. 
Machar has sought to court Sudan’s General 
‘Hemedti’, Khartoum’s new power broker, as 
evidenced by Machar’s successful bid for 
Hemedti to accompany Machar to Juba in 
September 2019. As yet, there is little to 
suggest Hemedti is interested or able to serve 
as Machar’s new regional patron, but in the 
Sudans it is usually a viable strategy to hold on 
and count on something unexpected.  
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5. Conclusion: South Sudan’s 
Predicament 
The first conclusion that can be drawn from 
this paper is the limitations of the post-2013 
peacemaking model. The ARCSS proved that 
the model of buying peace through the sudden 
promise of political capital into competing 
violent firms is likely to lead to instability. As of 
mid-2019, R-ARCSS is an under-funded 
political marketplace deal in an uncertain 
environment with multiple, overlapping efforts 
at regulation by external actors, some more 
important than others. This scenario has 
proven, momentarily, the least violent of three 
available options: the deregulated free market 
(as in the ARCSS collapse), an unfunded 
political marketplace deal (as in the ARCSS), 
and a modestly-funded political marketplace 
deal of today. Yet, by its nature, this status quo 
is temporary and unstable since the deal will 
not hold indefinitely in its under-funded state. 
Future scenarios may include a renegotiated 
political marketplace deal with a significantly 
reduced political budget, a reconfigured 
political marketplace resembling a centralized 
authoritarian kleptocracy, with the GoRSS at its 
apex, the collapse of the ceasefire and R-
ARCSS regulatory framework, or a renegotiated 
regulatory framework altogether based on the 
new political and financial realities of both 
South Sudan and its turbulent region. 
A second important conclusion is that external 
actors tangibly shaped the political economy of 
South Sudan through political market 
mechanisms, which were the unintended 
consequences of peace processes. 
Proliferation and fragmentation in the 
opposition was greatest during the period of 
‘deregulation’ from July 2016-December 2017, 
that is, in the absence of an active peace 
process. This suggests that an externalized 
peacebuilding process can be a factor in 
determining the structure of the conflict 
regardless of the final outcome or ‘success’ of 
the negotiations and implementation 
themselves. The peace process also provided 
a significant subsidy to the opposition, giving 
the SPLA-IO a political position which was not 
commensurate to its military strength. This, in 
turn, allowed the SPLA-IO to expand across 
South Sudan in the period from August 2015-
July 2016 after the signing of ARCSS. Even 
though unintended, these consequences were 
not unpredictable. External interventions 
should develop a more sophisticated approach 
that seeks to limit harm while intentionally 
deploying tools to stabilize the market and 
reduce the demand and supply of violence in 
the political marketplace.  
These macro market forces become 
embedded in the political logic itself. Just as 
electioneering tactics and parliamentarian 
maneuvers acquire their own ‘sporting’ 
legitimacy in Western democracies, so too 
have the logics of the political marketplace in 
South Sudan now formed the understood ‘rules 
of the game’ and continue to inform its tactical 
playbook. South Sudan’s political marketplace 
is becoming an institution. The irony that 
politics is the apparent exclusive path for 
improving South Sudan yet is also the clear 
and immediate cause of its continuous 
suffering is not lost on its more well-
intentioned actors, who cope with this 
dissonance on individual bases of personality, 
values, and ambition. South Sudanese operate 
in a much less kind political environment but 
not an obviously less principled one. In very 
brutal market conditions, market forces dictate 
that those who play the rules of the game most 
effectively survive; only political survivors can 
maintain political legitimacy as potential 
agents of change. This paradox of politics is 
not unique to South Sudan, though its severity 
is unusual. External actors are not outside 
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these market forces, especially when playing 
the role of would-be peacemakers. 
Thirdly, this case illustrates the need to 
distinguish between the PMF and a simple 
framework of economic determinism. In 
principle, a political system such a political 
marketplace ought to be highly individualistic 
and political actors should treat issues such as 
ethnicity, kinship and religion in an entirely 
instrumental manner. This would be an 
economically deterministic approach. Yet, as 
we have seen in South Sudan, political life 
continues to be organized on the basis of 
ethnic, lineage or sectarian units, albeit in very 
varied ways. As in traditional economics, 
macro market conditions in the political 
marketplace do not explain all micro forces, 
and has to be combined with other logics, 
including identity politics as well as ‘civicness’ 
to study the organization of politics. 
Finally, this exercise provides a background 
canvas against which the efforts of South 
Sudanese citizens, active in pursuing the rule 
of law, humanitarian and civic values, peace 
and democracy, can be enhanced. There is no 
simple state-building template for South 
Sudan, no shortlist of essential activities for a 
functioning state which constitute the 
playbook. This paper has not examined the role 
of such civil society actors, but it will be evident 
from the analysis that their immediate options 
are, (a) to carve out small spaces for civic 
action within the turbulence of the political 
market, including by using the same skills and 
tactics of political actors, albeit in ways 
informed by a different ethical code; (b) to build 
broader alliances including with external actors 
that share these civic values and can influence 
resource flows accordingly; (c) to hold on to 
modest achievements in formal settlements, 
such as Chapter V of ARCSS which contains 
provisions for justice and democracy; and (d) 
to work to promote moral codes of non-
violence, tolerance and dignity, that may 
ultimately be the most significant factor in 
taming the amoral ethic of the political 
marketplace. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This exercise provides a background 
canvas against which the efforts of 
South Sudanese citizens, a 
ctive in pursuing the rule of law, 
humanitarian and civic values, peace 
and democracy, can be enhanced. 
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